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Abstract 
 
Around 1500 Spain and Portugal were among the most affluent nations in the world, and had 
income levels which were similar to those of other Western European countries. Three hun-
dred years later the Iberian economies had lost their economic supremacy and fell behind all the 
main European powers. When did the first two global empires in history lose their hegemony 
to become secondary actors? What were the foundations of the collapse that explains the diver-
gence from northwestern Europe? In this chapter we address these issues and describe what we 
now know about the long-term trends of Iberian economies between 1500 and 1800. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the late middle ages, Western Europe was the richest region of the world, and Spain 
and Portugal were, even in the least favorable estimations, at average Western European in-
come levels.2 Three hundred years later, the Iberian economies had lost considerable ground 
and fell behind all the main European powers. In this chapter, we describe the comparative ag-
gregate performance of the Spanish and Portuguese economies during the early modern period. 
First, we present the evolution of incomes per capita and the changes experienced in the main 
sectors of these economies. Second, we discuss the regional dynamics to reveal whether the 
general trends present were common or whether we can find significant internal differences. 
Finally, we study the Spanish and Portuguese cases in a broader context, comparing their in-
comes per head with those of the main European powers. This reveals the moment when the 
Iberian countries diverged from northwestern and central Europe. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. GDP per capita in constant, 1990 “international" Geary-Khamis dollars for Spain, Portugal, 
and England, 1500-1850. Sources: for Spain, Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013); for Por-
tugal, Palma and Reis (2019); for England, Broadberry et al (2015). In the latter case, levels are extrapo-
                                                          
2 See Broadberry et al (2018, p. 989) for evidence that Europe was already ahead by 1500. In section 4 we discuss 
comparative Western European GDP per capita levels in detail. For a discussion of methodologies and sources 
used to build premodern GDPs, see Jong and Palma (2018) and Palma (2020).  
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lated backwards from the 1870 level for Great Britain, with growth rates corresponding to the borders 
of England until 1700 and Great Britain afterwards. 
 
Before diving into details, we provide some background on the overall performance of 
Iberia, by comparing with it with that of England (Figure 1).3 The divergence started relatively 
late – the English economy only took off relative to Spain from the mid-seventeenth century, 
and relatively to Portugal from the late seventeenth century.4 
 
In Spain, the sixteenth century was a period of sustained but slow economic growth, 
with flourishing production of raw wool that was also exported to international markets, at the 
same as the country forged its empire (Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, 2013).5 Spain 
was especially affected by the seventeenth century crisis, when increasing fiscal pressure hit 
urban economies and together with environmental deterioration reduced agrarian production 
(Álvarez-Nogal et al. 2016). It would not be until the eighteenth century that sluggish growth 
would resume, although by the end of the century income per capita was still below the maxi-
mums reached two hundred years before. 
 
As for Portugal, there was persistent growth in per capita incomes for long periods of 
time from the early sixteenth century onwards, but especially during c. 1630-1755, despite this 
being a period of population growth (Palma et al. 2019). The dynastic union of 1580-1640 was a 
period of convergence of Portuguese per capita incomes with those of Spain. In 1580, Portugal 
stood at 725 Geary–Khamis (GK) “international” 1990 dollars per head, compared with Spain’s 
                                                          
3 These numbers result from the recent efforts of economic historians who have collected much quantitative in-
formation from primary and secondary sources. They are far from set in stone, since their construction implies 
multiple methodological and data-related challenges (Jong and Palma 2018, Palma 2019). But they are certainly 
much better than the only alternative, the “guesstimates” of Maddison (2006, p. 249), who writes: "I assumed a 
growth rate of Spanish GDP per capita of 0.25 per cent a year from 1500-1600, no advance in the seventeenth 
century, and some mild progress from 1700 to 1820. I adopted a similar profile for Portugal". We now know that 
this last assumption, for instance, does not work well. As Figure 1 shows, Spanish and Portuguese early modern 
macroeconomic history was considerably different.  
4 In Figure 1, the levels for England for 1700-1850 in fact correspond more rigorously to Great Britain. If the line 
is indeed interpreted in this fashion, linking the indexes in 1700 and continuing to go back in time means implicit-
ly assuming that Scotland grew at the same rates as England prior to 1700. Given that the growth data is only 
available for the borders of England prior to 1700 and Britain thereafter, there is no perfect solution to this prob-
lem. However, any adjustment that could make to the English series would lie within the reasonable margins of 
error which must be attributed to the series shown in Figure 1. Since there is less uncertainty about trends than 
levels, we prefer to call the line “England” to emphasize that there was no growth in that territory over the 1500-
1650 period. 
5 However, production of woolen textiles (as opposed to raw wool) declined. 
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920. By contrast, by the Restauration of the Portuguese Monarchy in 1640, Portugal was rich-
er, at 895 GK “international” 1990 dollars per capita, compared with Spain’s 819. The first half 
of the eighteenth century was a period of relatively fast imperial and commodity-driven 
growth, which also interacted positively with agricultural productivity (Costa et al 2015). 
However, the second half of the eighteenth century was characterized by a period of no growth, 
in turn followed by fast decline from about 1790. The process of decline would continue persis-
tently (with only a partial recovery around 1810-20) well into the nineteenth century (Palma 
and Reis 2019). 
 
While knowing the timing of divergence does not give us direct answers with regards 
to the causes, it is sufficient to exclude some hypotheses. For example, for both Spain and Por-
tugal, the divergence comes too late to have any medieval origins, whether cultural or institu-
tional. At the same time, it comes too early, in both countries, in order for the Napoleonic Inva-
sions to be blamed. However, perhaps Iberia’s macroeconomic performance vis-à-vis England is 
not so surprising in view of the fact that Spanish and Portuguese political institutions became 
visible worse than those of England from the middle of the seventeenth century (Henriques and 
Palma 2019). In fact, it is remarkable that there is such a good temporal match between the 
timing of the political and economic divergence. The reasons for that political shift are yet to be 
understood in full. 
 
2. Spain 
 
Overall, the study of Spanish economic history has been framed by the notion of a poor econo-
my in decline. But recent work has suggested that far from being a backward economy, Spain 
was already an affluent nation (by the standards of the time) prior to early modern imperial 
expansion (Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2007, 2013; Álvarez-Nogal et al 2016). 
The new estimations of preindustrial GDP in Spain are based on the use of urbanization rates 
for the estimation of the secondary and tertiary sector and on indirect and direct estimations of 
agricultural production. Although they use different sources, these different studies show con-
sistent results which define very similar long term trends. However, we should note that far 
from being a homogeneous economy, Spain was the combination of a number of regions that 
often presented very different economic experiences, following trends that overtime became 
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particularly divergent between its interior and periphery. Figure 2 shows a map of early mod-
ern Spain. 
 
Figure 2. Map of Spain. Early modern regional divisions as presented in Álvarez-Nogal and 
Prados de la Escosura (2007). 
 
Output per head was relatively high in Spain in the mid-fourteenth century, but the ef-
fects of the Black Death in Spain were very different to those observed in other countries in 
Europe. In the Spanish case, instead of improving output per capita, the demographic shock 
produced a significant decline. The Malthusian pressures that were present in other parts of 
Europe did not exist in Spain, which was characterized by a low demographic pressure econo-
my. The Black Death not only diminished the already scarce labor available, but also destroyed 
the market networks that existed in the country (Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 
2013). The sixteenth century was in turn a period of recovery and by the 1590s Spain had al-
most recovered the output per capita reached in the mid-fourteenth century. However, the sev-
enteenth century crisis hit Spain particularly hard, and output per capita fell rapidly once more, 
in a decline that continued until the end of the century.  
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The contraction of the Spanish economy was the result of a combination of internal and 
external factors. Climate change that took place in the late-sixteenth century, and that extend-
ed its effects during the first half of the seventeenth century, had remarkably negative effects in 
Spain (Alvarez-Nogal et al. 2016). The so-called ‘initial oscillation’ reduced temperatures and 
increased floods, with a consequent significant impact on the agrarian economy (Barriendos 
1994; Rodrigo et al. 1999). At the same time, the enormous increase in military expenditure led 
the king to stop payments to the bankers in Genoa between 1575 and 1577, affecting local 
bankers and small merchants. The country also suffered monetary instability from the 1590s 
onwards, namely due to the devaluation of the vellón.6 The urban centers were hit particularly 
hard and the market economy that had emerged during the sixteenth century was destroyed.7 
During the eighteenth century, Spain was finally able to achieve steady sluggish growth, but it 
was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the country was able to recover the 
output per capita levels of the mid-fourteenth century.8 
 
2.1. Income per capita 
 
The territories that currently form Spain were far from been a unified ecosystem: they 
were neither a unified economy nor a single political entity. Part of the explanation behind the 
different regional growth paths is related to the different institutions that dominated the terri-
tories that form current Spain. Land distribution was more equal in the northern coast from 
Galicia to Navarre and produced more egalitarian societies. The situation was different in the 
Meseta where lords were able to exercise higher coercive power against peasants often through 
the election of officials in key administrative positions, while the existence of large latifundia in 
the south increased inequality. In Aragon the power of the lords was almost total and the influ-
ence of the King limited, offering less room to peasants to organise their own production, a 
situation similar to Valencia where lords also had a great independence from the King. In Cata-
lonia on the other hand, institutional changes derived from the late sixteenth century decreased 
                                                          
6 Between 1566 and the early 1580s Spanish coinage had a considerable amount of silver (vellón rico). But while 
from the 1580s to 1596 it had 8 grams of silver per coin, this fell to only 1 gram during1596-1598, and continued 
to fall thereafter, especially after 1602. 
7 The increase in fiscal charges in Castile in the wake of the revolt of the Comuneros was also significant. The 
alcabalas, a tax that had to be collected by the cities in Castile, was doubled, new taxes for the consumption of 
goods like wine, meat and oil were introduced (Alvarez-Nogal et al. 2016). 
8 For an alternative hypothesis about the reasons for Spanish decline, see Grafe (2012). 
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the power of the lords and made the continuation of bad practices more difficult (Yun Casalilla 
2019, p.30).  Inheritance systems also played a key role in the distribution of economic assets. 
Indivisible inheritance dominated large areas including the Crown of Aragon and most of the 
north, while inheritance laws in the rest of the country imposed a more equal distribution of 
assets (Ferrer Alòs 2011, p.268). The regions of the Crown of Aragon also made extensive use 
of enfiteusis (lifelong leases on land) which provided stability for peasants, encouraged invest-
ments and gave peasants more control over their production.  
Therefore, the large climatic, economic and institutional diversity present at the time 
meant that the economic history of Spain during the modern age should be framed within the 
existence of regional economic histories.  
 
Spain 
New 
Castile Andalusia Murcia 
Old Castile 
/Leon Valencia 
Balearic 
Islands Catalonia 
1530 87 99 114 90 90 97 128 88 
1591 93 150 93 96 93 94 134 79 
1700 83 110 109 105 70 72 146 89 
1750 80 154 101 98 62 79 110 73 
1787 81 143 100 93 61 85 97 100 
1857 100 145 117 78 82 95 133 128 
 
Table 1. Total output per head (Spain in 1857 = 100).  Source: Álvarez-Nogal and 
Prados de la Escosura (2007) 
The growth of the sixteenth century was dominated by the regions of the interior where 
the economic expansion took place thanks to dynamic urban economies and wool trade that at 
the same time increased the demand of a more diversified agrarian economy. The environmen-
tal limitations of the interior pushed peasants to look for alternative sources of income in activi-
ties like transports that helped and reinforced trade and the system of fairs (Yun Casalilla, 
2019, p. 109). New Castile was also heavily influenced by the presence of Madrid (declared the 
capital of the country in 1561), which, according to some authors, determined the economic fate 
of the whole region (see for instance Ringrose 1983, p. 15). As Table 1 shows, GDP per capita 
grew rapidly between 1530 and 1591 presenting the highest growth rates of all the regions 
with an average yearly growth rate of 0.69 per cent. Without the economic push of the capital 
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and less room for agrarian expansion, the growth in Old Castile was more moderate. The pe-
ripheral regions present a much differentiated growth pattern in the long term. In the eastern 
coast and in contrast to the interior, both Catalonia and Valencia show a moderate decrease of 
their income per capita levels during the sixteenth century that lasted longer in the case of Va-
lencia.  In the south, Andalusia did not benefit as much as the interior from the growth experi-
enced in the sixteenth century, and in fact income per capita levels decreased between 1530 and 
1591.  
The seventeenth century crisis was harder in those regions that had grown more during 
the previous century. In the interior, New Castile had declined considerably by 1700, and alt-
hough the crisis was not as hard in Old Castile, it lasted longer and the recovery did not appear 
until the eighteenth century. In the periphery, the crisis was milder in Catalonia and Valencia, 
although the recovery in the latter region would take longer than in the former. In Andalusia 
the seventeenth century was a period of growth that although moderate, contrasted with the 
sharp decline experienced in the interior and also in other peripheral territories. 
The different recovery rates that followed the seventeenth century crisis mark the be-
ginning of a little divergence within the Spanish economy with the rise of the periphery and the 
relative decline of the interior. By 1700 Catalonia had already recovered the income lost during 
the crisis and although Valencia had to wait longer, it also presented a very intense recovery 
during the eighteenth century.  The expansion was also intense in the case of New Castile in 
the first half of the eighteenth century but stopped abruptly afterwards, while Old Castile re-
mained immersed in a long period of stagnation with income per capita levels in 1787 well be-
low those achieved in 1591. The lack of a growth pole like Madrid, and especially the disinte-
gration of the urban networks including the collapse of Valladolid, deepened the crisis (Yun 
Casalilla, 1990, p. 569).  The resilience that Andalusia displayed to the effects of the general 
crisis weakened in the eighteenth century that was a period of stagnation with income per capi-
ta remaining relatively stable.  
2.2. National trends in agriculture 
The lack of official records for premodern times makes necessary the use of alternative 
sources for the estimation of agrarian production. The payment of the tithe, usually ten per 
cent of the output generated by each producer, has been extensively used by economic histori-
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ans  to estimate long term changes of agrarian production in the past. We should however take 
into account that its payment became less common in the late eighteenth century, and after the 
Napoleonic invasion the source becomes very unreliable. Nonetheless, the source is a solid op-
tion to proxy low swings in the agrarian sector, particularly in the case of Spain where the 
amount of information available is higher than for other countries. Figure 3 shows the estima-
tion of total production in Spain using tithe series between 1500 and 1800. The estimation in-
cludes a wide range of products including the three that dominated Spanish agriculture (grain, 
olive oil and wine), as well as other sectors like livestock or vegetables.9  
 
Figure 3. Agricultural output in Spain, 1500-1800. Sources: Álvarez-Nogal et al. (2016)                                                                                      
Total production increased between 1500 and 1800, although there were clear long 
term swings within the period. Agrarian production in Spain increased between 1500 and the 
1570s, with a growth that was particularly intense during the second half of the century. The 
primary sector experienced a severe contraction during the following decades that coincide 
with the general crisis of the seventeenth century where Spanish agrarian output continued to 
decline until the first decade of the century. A period of relative stagnation followed, until 
growth resumed in the mid seventeenth century and continued peaking in the 1750s to suffer a 
                                                          
9 For a detailed description of the series used and the products included, see Álvarez-Nogal et al. (2016). 
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quick contraction and later recovery. Nonetheless, by 1800 total agricultural production had 
barely recovered the maximum levels achieved fifty years before.  
If we take into account the evolution of population to estimate Spanish agrarian output 
in per capita levels, the long term trends and particularly the levels present some important 
differences. Figure 4 shows the estimation of agrarian output per head using tithe records. 
 
Figure 4. Agricultural output per head in Spain, 1500-1800. Sources: Álvarez-Nogal et 
al. (2016) 
In per head terms, agrarian production remained relatively stable during most of the 
sixteenth century, although it experienced a sharp decline during the last decades which lasted 
until the first decades of the seventeenth century. A process of recovery took place until the 
1750s followed by a decline. Therefore, we can distinguish three main features in Spanish agri-
culture between 1500 and 1800. The first one is that the maximum levels of agrarian produc-
tion per head in Spain were reached in the early sixteenth century, the second is the sharp con-
traction that followed until the seventeenth century, and the third is that the slow recovery 
that was not enough to recuperate the levels achieved in the late sixteenth century.  
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The early affluence achieved by Spanish agrarian producers was also manifested relative 
to other European economies. In the first decades of the sixteenth century, agrarian output per 
capita was around 20 per cent higher than in Holland and almost 40 per cent higher than in 
Britain (Álvarez-Nogal et al. 2016, p. 466). The success of agriculture in Spain during the six-
teenth century can be understood linked to the development of the urban economies that driven 
by domestic and international trade, increased the demand of primary products and fostered the 
development in the countryside. However, since the late sixteenth century, the rampant fiscal 
pressure that was especially hard in the cities, monetary instability and the alteration of inter-
national trade due to the increasing political conflicts, had a devastating effect in the trade net-
works that were the engine of urban wealth.10  
Between 1500 and 1800, economically active population moved together with agrarian 
production per capita. This suggests that far from been subjected to Malthusian forces, Spanish 
agriculture could be better defined as a frontier economy. Therefore, demographic shocks like 
the one suffered in the seventeenth century instead of benefiting output per worker, dismantled 
a system where the collapse of the urban economies decreased agrarian production not only in 
absolute but also in per capita terms. The situation was worsened by a deterioration of climatic 
conditions that as consequence of the effects of the Little Ice Age became colder and wetter in 
key periods of agrarian recession, like from the late sixteenth to mid seventeenth century or the 
second half of the eighteenth century (Rodrigo et al. 2001). The combined forces of an urban 
economy pushed to its limits, unfavourable climatic conditions, and the rural spill-overs from 
the economic and institutional negative effects of American silver (Palma 2019) produced a 
deep crisis in Spanish agriculture that would not recover in centuries.  
2.3. Regional trends in agriculture 
Climate played a vital role in the creation of different regional agrarian systems in Spain 
and helps us to understand the different patterns followed at regional level. A large region oc-
cupying most of the northern coast from Galicia to Navarre enjoyed high rainfall levels that 
allowed the development of animal husbandry and helped peasants on the event of harvest fail-
ures. Lower rainfall levels and a more extreme climate in the interior developed a system of dry 
crops and livestock dominated by large flocks of sheep that was controlled by the Mesta, a key 
                                                          
10 See Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley (2014, 2016), Ruiz Martín (1968) and Álvarez-Nogal (2005). 
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institution created to maintain and control the production of wool.  The milder ecosystem in 
the Mediterranean coast made possible the creation of a mixed system with a more diversified 
agriculture.  
Although we can find some general trends, the evolution of agrarian production in 
Spain at regional level between 1500 and 1800 also presents important differences. The growth 
that took place during the sixteenth century was dominated by the areas in the eastern Medi-
terranean coast and also New Castile. New crops gained importance in the Mediterranean coast 
including rice, sugar, mulberry trees or wine that in areas of Valencia represented up to one 
fifth of total production each (Furio, 1995, p. 279). The growth in New Castile was possible 
thanks to the combination of large portions of uncultivated land and migratory movements 
from the northern regions that participated in the harvests of wheat and silk (Yun Casalilla, 
2019, p. 127). 
Andalusia and the eastern Mediterranean were also the regions where the agrarian cri-
sis appeared first and was more intense during the last decades of the sixteenth century, while 
the fall in agrarian production began later and was harder in the interior. The crisis was espe-
cially hard in Old Castile, where the dismantling of the urban trade networks was more intense 
(Garcia Sanz, 1982, p. 376). The north on the other hand, presented a very different and dis-
tinctive pattern during the seventeenth century, characterised by a growth that was possible 
thanks to the introduction of new products like maize that also allowed the expansion of arable 
lands that were not so suitable for traditional crops (Bilbao Bilbao and Fernández de Pinedo, 
2018, p.123). The large presence of animal husbandry mitigated part of the crisis while the in-
crease of fiscal pressure was less damaging thanks to the high levels of self-consumption (Yun 
Casalilla 2019, p. 425).  
The eastern Mediterranean recovered quickly during the second half of the seventeenth 
century and until 1800 presented higher growth rates in agrarian output than the interior, sup-
ported by local demographic growth (Palop Ramos, 1982, p. 410). Catalonia experienced a rapid 
increase of viticulture from the late seventeenth century encouraged by exports to England and 
the introduction of more efficient contracts like the rabassa morta (Carmona and Simson, 1999). 
Following the expansion of irrigated land, agriculture also diversified in Valencia with the ex-
tension of rice, wine and mulberry trees that in certain areas occupied almost half of all culti-
vated land (Furio, 1995, p.327). The damaged from the expulsion of the Moriscos was quickly 
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compensated thanks to the repopulation through internal migrations.  The crisis of the seven-
teenth century was longer in the interior and Andalusia that also presented lower growth rates 
than the peripheries during the following century. Therefore, between the mid seventeenth 
century and 1800 a process of divergence took place between a more dynamic periphery and the 
interior of the country.  
2.4. Secondary and tertiary sectors 
Urbanisation rates, commonly used in the literature to proxy the evolution of the sec-
ondary and tertiary sectors, increased in Spain during the sixteenth century thanks to the de-
velopment of domestic and international trade, particularly of wool and also to the imperial 
expansion. A decline that was especially sharp in the Crown of Castile took place during the 
seventeenth century and was connected with the dismantlement of the trade networks, partially 
consequence of the increasing taxation that was especially hard in the Castilian cities. The re-
covery that followed after 1700 was very intense and on average, by 1750 Spain had recovered 
the urbanisation levels of 1591. However, the national averages hide the existence of regional 
dynamics where the economic centre of the country moved from the interior to the periphery 
(Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Urbanisation rates in Spain, 1530-1857. Source: created from Álvarez-Nogal 
and Prados de la Escosura (2007).                              
The sixteenth century was dominated by the pre-eminence of the interior and particu-
larly by the role of its urban and trade networks. In New Castile urbanisation rates increased 
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from 6.7 per cent in 1530 to more than 24 per cent in 1591 in a process that followed the ex-
pansion of the agrarian sector that was also important in the case of Extremadura. Textile pro-
duction linked to wool experienced an intense growth in cities like Cuenca that with Segovia 
probably became the largest textile producers in the Iberian Peninsula thanks to its privileged 
position within the Mesta system (Reher, 1990, p. 16). The increase of urbanisation levels in Old 
Castile was more moderate, as it was in the periphery like Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon that 
present a modest growth during the sixteenth century starting from already very high levels in 
the case of the first two. There were important improvements in key sectors like trade in the 
coast that increased in the area thanks to the improvements in security against the actions of 
northern African pirates and the increasing connections with Genoa and its merchants (Furio, 
1995, p. 285). On average, the regions of the north also present small increases in urbanisation 
with the exception of Navarre where it more than doubled. In the south, Andalusia also in-
creased the share of the population living in urban areas, as in the case of Catalonia and Valen-
cia from already very high levels. 
The impact of the seventeenth century crisis was felt in all the regions with the only ex-
ception of Andalusia, where the cities from the coast, particularly Seville and later Cadiz, bene-
fited from the expanding empire. The decline was sharp in the interior, especially in Extrema-
dura and Old and New Castile that suffered the collapse of the trade networks and increasing 
taxation. The manufacturing growth poles that dominated the expansion of the sixteenth cen-
tury almost disappeared, as the case of Cuenca where in 1721 there were almost 1,485 houses 
abandoned and in ruins (Reher, 1990, p. 16). In the periphery the effects of the seventeenth cen-
tury crisis were hard, particularly in Valencia were delayed in the case of Catalonia. Urbanisa-
tion remained stable in Catalonia until 1700, while in the case of Valencia the percentage of 
urban population decreased sharply during the seventeenth century crisis. Silk manufacturers 
in Valencia were particularly hit by the expulsion of the moriscos that were key on its produc-
tion (Gonzalez Enciso et al., 1992, p. 123). Aragon showed very similar trends to Catalonia and 
especially Valencia.  The northern regions present a decrease that on the other hand was not as 
hard as in the interior.  
The recovery that followed the general crisis reinforced the divergence that took place 
in the agrarian sector between a stagnating interior and a dynamic periphery with the only 
exception of New Castile, where the growth of Madrid compensated the decrease of other tradi-
15 
 
tional urban centres. In Old Castile and Extremadura the recovery of the eighteenth century 
was so slow that it would not be until 1857 that both regions would reached the urbanisation 
levels achieved in 1591. In large areas of Castile urban centres lost ground, and a ruralisation 
process took place with the primary sector increasing its weight in the cities (Marcos Martín, 
2000, p. 513). In addition to the quantitative loss, textile manufacturers in cities like Segovia or 
Palencia also had to reduce the quality of their products to adapt them to a different market 
(Garcia Sanz, 1985, p. 18). In the periphery the recovery was very intense in Catalonia, Valencia 
and Aragon, particularly during the eighteenth century when urbanisation rates grew rapidly 
to historical maximum levels by the end of the century. While fiscal pressure increased particu-
larly in the Crown of Castile, cities in Catalonia or Valencia were not taxed as much as those in 
the interior allowing a more efficient allocation of disposable capital (Yun Casalilla, 2019, p. 
428). The experience in the north was diverse with Galicia stagnating, Navarre presenting a 
moderate growth and the Basque Country experiencing a very intense growth especially dur-
ing the second half of the eighteenth century. Although the growth of urbanisation rates in 
Andalusia decreased, the region maintained a steady increase.  
Summarising, activity in the secondary and tertiary sector present significant regional 
differences that as in the case of agriculture moved the economic centre of Spain from the inte-
rior to the periphery. The long-lasting effects of the seventeenth century crisis in the cities of 
the interior and the sluggish recovery that followed contrasted with the quick and intense re-
covery that was experienced in the periphery, reinforcing the effects of the little divergence 
within the Spanish economy. 
3. Portugal 
 
While the literature in economic history has long considered Portugal to have been 
backward and in decline, or at least stagnation, during the early modern period (see for instance 
Allen 2005 or van Zanden 2009), actual data on GDP or real wages did not exist until recently. 
Using a large dataset for prices, wages, and rents taken from the archives of a variety of institu-
tions, such as hospitals and monasteries, and representative of the whole country, Palma and 
Reis (2019) have recently put together the first GDP series for Portugal from 1527 and 1850.11  
                                                          
11 In contrast to the Palma and Reis (2019) approach which is based on data from contemporary sources, Maddison 
(2006, p. 249), simply assumed his figures for Portugal, as we have noticed. 
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Regional trends did not usually differ markedly from the national trend, though there 
are some caveats. Figure 6 shows the location of the four regions used in the construction of 
the national GDP by Palma and Reis (2019): the hinterlands of the country’s main cities, Porto, 
Coimbra, Lisbon, and Évora. In turn, Figure 7 shows the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for these 
4 regions, and Figure 8 the skilled real wage indexes. These figures show that commodities and 
labor markets were highly integrated in Portugal. 
 
Figure 6. Map of Portugal. The borders correspond to the eighteenth century provinces, and 
the map indicates locations referred to in Palma and Reis (2019), which is also the source for 
this figure. 
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Figure 7. CPI for 4 regions of Portugal, 1527-1850. Source: Palma and Reis (2019) 
 
 
Figure 8. Skilled real wages for 4 regions of Portugal, 1527-1850. Source: Palma and Reis 
(2019) 
 
3.1. Income per capita 
 
Figure 9 shows Portugal’s GDP per capita in constant prices. Portugal’s macroeconom-
ic history was highly nonlinear, far from an oversimplified Malthusian situation. The late mid-
dle ages corresponded to a favorable situation (Henriques and Reis 2019, Henriques et al 2019, 
Cardoso and Garcia 2009) which was followed by a period of decline lasting until about 1550. 
It’s important to notice from the outset that Portugal’s economy did not perform particularly 
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well during the sixteenth century, even if this may seem surprising to those who feel that trade 
associated with the overseas empire must have had central importance. This is easily explained 
by the very small volumes of that trade by comparison with the overall size of the economy 
(Costa et al 2015).  
 
Intensive (per capita) output growth is clearly noticeable since the 1630s, but a 3rd de-
gree polynomial suggests that it may have started earlier, in the last quarter of the sixteenth 
century.12 Remarkably, economic growth was accompanied by demographic growth until the 
mid-eighteenth century, when returns from the imperial economy were at its peak (Palma et al 
2017; Costa et al 2015).13 Around the time of the 1755 earthquake, Portugal stopped growing, 
though income levels stayed at comparatively high plateau; then in the 1790s a persistent peri-
od of decline began, and this was to continue well into the nineteenth century. As a conse-
quence, Portugal was to become Western Europe’s poorest country by 1850. Portugal’s process 
of modern economic growth only started a century later, in the 1950s. 
 
 
Figure 9. Portugal’s GDP per capita, in constant prices (“international” 1990 Geary-
Khamis dollars). Source: Palma and Reis (2019). 
 
                                                          
12 As is often the case with historical data and methods, there is some uncertainly about the exact timings. 
13 Modern tests of the Mathusian model and its variations have relied primarily on the Wrigley-Schofield demo-
graphic data for England, one of the main available sources of annual national data on population stocks for a pre-
modern economy. But Portugal underwent about 200 period years of growth of both population and income per 
capita (Palma et al 2019, Palma and Reis 2019). The combination of intensive and extensive growth is uncommon 
in premodern economies, as it is a feature of modern economic growth (Kuznets 1966, p. 34-85 and Broadberry et 
al 2015, p. 3). 
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It is difficult to pin the exact reasons for the dismal performance of the Portuguese 
economy from the mid-eighteenth century onwards.14 One proximate reason must have been 
the fact that the engines of much of the growth during the previous decades were exhausted, 
but no new sources of growth appeared. Progress had been driven by the effects of maize on 
agriculture, by the boom generated by Brazilian growth and perhaps by the lagged effects of 
some earlier institutional progress.15 The imperial economy also had an increasing impact as 
time went by, but commodity-driven growth could not last forever, and was indeed put to a 
sudden stop with the opening of Brazil’s ports to direct international trade in 1808, followed by 
the loss of Brazil itself in 1822. Additionally, Portugal’s productive specialization and other 
internal conditions did not favor the development of a formalized schooling system, which be-
came increasingly important for more successful European economies as the nineteenth century 
rolled in. In turn, economic geography favored more central regions of Europe. Finally, institu-
tional evolution was not favorable from the late seventeenth century onward (Henriques and 
Palma 2019), a development which was caused at least partially by an institutional resource 
curse caused by discovery of the Brazilian gold (Macedo 1982; Palma 2019).16 
 
3.2. National trends in agriculture 
 
The most important factor underlying Portugal’s positive growth performance from 
around 1600 until the mid-eighteenth century was the extent of structural transformation. Ta-
ble 2 shows the remarkable progress which took place over the 1600-1750 period.17 As column 
4 shows, the percentage of the population working in the secondary and tertiary sectors grew 
from 31% in 1600 to a remarkable 47% in 1750. This progress, however, not sustained. As late 
as 1800 it was still at 45% but it then declined to only 33% by 1850. This process of “de-
                                                          
14 One popular explanation concerns the differentially negative effects of the Catholic religion compared with, for 
instance, Protestantism. It is to be noted, however, that Portugal had a numeracy rate close to the most advanced 
countries in Europe as late as the eighteenth century (Stolz et al. 2013, pp.562-4).This situation was to change 
drastically in the nineteenth century. 
15 A series of legal reforms (Ordenações Manuelinas), which were progressively issued from 1512 to 1605, encour-
aged the standardization of weights and measures, and may have prompted specialization gains from additional 
market integration. It is not clear how much these legal changes were enforced, since the laws were periodically 
reissued – a sign of previous limited enforcement. Furthermore, a regional diversity of weights and measures per-
sisted well into the nineteenth century. 
16 There were also notable problems of judicial enforcement (Rodrigues 2019), though more comparative evidence 
on this matter, from an international perspective, would be welcome. 
17 Ribeiro da Silva and Carvalhal (2017), using a different methodology and sources as compared with Table 2, 
nevertheless reach similar conclusions both in terms of magnitude and timing of structural change. 
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industrialization” (which, to be rigorous, also represented a decline of the service sector) is the 
most salient feature of the Portuguese macroeconomic history, and it largely determined the 
fall in GDP per capita observed in the late eighteenth century and for much of the first half of 
the nineteenth. Structural change would fail to take place for a long time. Going beyond the 
years of Table 2, the percentage of the population working outside agriculture continued com-
paratively low, at 34% in 1862 and 1890, only growing to 37% by 1900. As late as 1911, it was 
still considerably lower than it had been in 1750, at 39%.18 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) = (1) + (2) (5) = (1) / (4) 
 
Urban 
Rural Non 
Agricultural Agricultural Total Non-Agricultural 
Urban/Total Non-
Agricultural 
1500 0.155 0.169 0.676 0.324 0.479 
1550 0.151 0.161 0.688 0.312 0.485 
1600 0.132 0.173 0.695 0.305 0.432 
1650 0.124 0.239 0.637 0.363 0.343 
1700 0.125 0.286 0.589 0.411 0.304 
1750 0.173 0.291 0.535 0.465 0.373 
1800 0.162 0.289 0.549 0.451 0.359 
1850 0.176 0.155 0.669 0.331 0.531 
 
Table 2. Portugal’s population shares by total by occupation. Note: Urban corresponds to 
population >5,000. Source: Palma and Reis (2019). 
The principal alteration in Portugal’s agriculture over the early modern period consist-
ed of the gradual replacement of pastoral by arable production (Reis 2017, p. 174), the rise of 
wine and oil production, and an important shift from wheat, rye and millet to American corn 
(maize).19 During an initial period, in the two or three decades following 1500, there was a ten-
dency for incomes to decline, a trend shared with some other European economies. This corre-
                                                          
18 The percentages for 1862, 1890, 1900, and 1911 are from Reis (2005). 
19 Costa et al. (2015, 2018), Magalhães (2010). We note in passing that the shift from animal to grain production 
corresponds to a shift from a land to a labor intensive mode of production, which suggests increased population 
pressure on the land (Henriques and Reis 2019). 
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sponded to continued population catch-up from the post-bubonic plague population levels. In 
the absence of sufficient trade, technical or institutional change, incomes fell.20  
Agriculture, which in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries had been predominant-
ly pastoral (Medeiros 1993) gradually switched to arable, a change in which – given individuals’ 
taste for variety in food intake – they were only willing to incur since it was a way to feed more 
people without improvements in technology. From the mid-sixteenth century onward, incomes 
tended to grew both intensively and extensively for around 200 years. This was caused by a 
combination of factors of varying degrees of importance. Land clearances were capital-intensive 
and appeared to have played a significant role. They led to more intensive usage of the land and 
hence to higher levels of production. The introduction of maize also took place in this period, 
and spread considerable, especially in the north of the country (the Douro region). 
  
By the early eighteenth century, several irrigation projects were needed to allow for the 
expansion of maize and viticulture. These often required considerable fixed costs to be imple-
mented. The gold windfall may have helped finance these projects, as it affected people’s income 
both directly through remittances and indirectly through higher land-labor ratios resulting 
from the emigration of people to Brazil in the context of the gold rush. The cash which was 
available for investments was complemented by a vibrant credit market, which lasted until 
about the time of the 1755 earthquake (Costa et al. 2018). 
Wine cultivation also expanded considerably in the Douro region following the 1703 
Methuen treaty with England – a treaty which was closely related to the incoming gold wind-
fall (Macedo 1982, p. 45), and which concerned military and geopolitical matters as much as 
trade in a strict sense. The increased availability of means of payment increased incomes both 
directly and also indirectly, by decreasing the transaction costs of participating in the market, 
allowing for a more monetized and specialized economy. For a few decades, at least, the net 
effects of the gold windfall were positive. But this was not to last (Palma 2019). 
The economic expansion boom up to the 1755 earthquake was followed by a period of 
stagnation which lasted until the 1780s. Afterwards, a period of persistent decline was initiated, 
continuing well into the nineteenth century, with a noticeable short-lived rebound only during 
                                                          
20 The returns from the empire were growing but were still too small at this point to matter a great deal (Costa et 
al 2015). 
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the 1810s. This decline had multiple causes. From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, many 
of the previous sources of growth became progressively exhausted: gold remittances declined, 
further expansion of maize was not possible, and the privileged wine export to England came to 
an end. Eventually, following the invasion by Napoleon’s troops in 1807, the court escaped to 
Brazil. As a delayed but direct consequence of the latter, that empire was lost in 1822. The loss 
of Brazil, albeit sooner or later inevitable, may have at the time mattered a good deal, in light of 
the fact that, according to one estimate, severing colonial trade around 1800 would lead to a 
real wage between one fifth and one fourth lower than that observed (Costa et al 2015). 
While in several parts of the European periphery the increased usage of iron agricultur-
al improvements was a source of growth from the eighteenth century (Edvinsson 2013), the 
evidence which exists for parts of Portugal suggests their usage was still limited well into the 
nineteenth century (Fonseca and Reis 2011). And while some internal industries became less 
competitive in a Dutch-disease type scenario as the result of the windfall (Macedo 1982, p. 55-
56), the negative effects of institutional change started to be felt, and these political changes 
were likely to have been at least as important as the strictly economic aspects (and to have had 
repercussions for the latter). The eighteenth century experienced unfavorable institutional 
change, with the Cortes not meeting over the entire century, in sharp contrast with what had 
happened in previous centuries (Henriques and Palma 2019). But the possible role of political 
economy factors in arresting the development of the economy after the mid-eighteenth century 
has been subject to different, and sometimes conflicting, interpretations in the Portuguese liter-
ature. Pereira (2009) claims, unconvincingly, that the 1755 earthquake led to benevolent politi-
cal changes; see Madureira (1997) for contrary evidence. In turn, Macedo (1982) argues that 
the windfall of Brazilian gold had negative consequences, though not much detail is given. 
Palma (2019) shows that Spain and Portugal, being first-order receivers of the American wind-
fall, did suffer from Dutch disease and institutional resource course as a consequence. 
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Figure 10. Land rents index for 1565-1850, in constant prices. Source: Palma and Reis (2019), 
which for nominal rents rely on two series consisting of cash rents from large commercial es-
tates, with leases between 3 and 10 years. These correspond to the Archive of the Hospital of 
All Saints in Lisbon (ten estates), and set of 32 estates in Alentejo (Santos 2003); see Reis 
(2017) for details. The nominal amounts were spliced and deflated by the CPI of Palma and 
Reis (2019). 
 
 
Figure 11. Index of agricultural GDP per capita for 1527-1850, in constant prices. Source: 
Palma and Reis (2019). 
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3.3. Secondary and tertiary sectors 
 
Portugal underwent considerable structural transformation during 1600-1750: the per-
centage of people working outside agriculture went from 31% to 46% (Table 2, column 3). The 
transformation was gradual. As previously mentioned, there was economic growth from the 
last quarter of the sixteenth century until about 1690. This was largely due to structural 
change: the percentage of workers outside agriculture rose to 41% by 1700 (Table 2, column 3). 
After 1690 Portugal entered a period of decline which lasted less than two decades, before 
growing considerably until around the time of the 1755 earthquake, when the share of workers 
outside agriculture stood at a remarkably high 46%. 
Incomes per head then declined a little but stayed at a comparatively high plateau, be-
fore starting to fall precipitously from the 1780s, a decline which would continue for until the 
1810s. This was followed by a partial, short lived recovery, but then incomes per person stayed 
constant in the following decades. Still, as late as 1800, the percentage of workers outside of 
agriculture was 45%. Over the first half of the nineteenth century there was a return to agricul-
ture, with  this percentage falling to 33% by 1850 (Table 2, column 3). 
The productive structure of the Portuguese economy did not change dramatically dur-
ing the early modern period but neither was it static. Industry consisted of wool and linen tex-
tiles, leather, construction and all the other provisions for the necessities of daily life. Luxuries 
and manufactured exports occupied secondary positions, though they began to enjoy an in-
creasing role during the eighteenth century. In the tertiary (services) sector, apart from the 
normal contribution of transport, trade, administration and shipping in such economies, it is 
worth noting the significant element of colonially oriented activity.21 
Portugal’s industry had at times enjoyed a moderate degree of success but two factors 
hampered its future growth. First, it had often enjoyed access to privileged overseas markets, 
first and foremost Brazil; this access began to be disrupted from the 1790s by the geopolitical 
situation, and was further hampered by the opening of Brazil’s ports to trade with Britain in 
1808. Privileged access ended once with Brazil’s independence in 1822. Secondly, the part of 
Portugal’s industry which was directed at the internal market had often been located in the 
provinces, a side effect of the 1703 Methuen treaty (Macedo 1982). The small size of the inter-
                                                          
21 For a revision of the contribution of the colonial empire to the domestic economy, see Costa et al. (2015). 
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nal market then combined with the relatively low levels of urbanization and lack of structural 
transformation to prevented agglomeration gains which were becoming increasingly important 
elsewhere in Europe.  
4. Comparisons 
 
4.1. Iberian comparative performance 
 
The comparative performance of the two Iberian economies, shown in Figure 1, sug-
gests that while both economies ended up in a similar position in the very long run, they fol-
lowed rather different trends as time went by. They started from similar levels around 1550. 
Spain’s economy performed better than that of Portugal in the third quarter of the sixteenth 
century, but the period of the 1580-1640 dynastic union was one of convergence: Portugal grew 
and Spain declined. By the time of the restauration of the Portuguese monarchy in 1640, Por-
tugal’s per capita income was higher.22 Then during the second half of the seventeenth century, 
Spain’s economy began to decline, in absolute as well as comparative terms. The economy stag-
nated until about 1750, but it started growing afterwards, a process which was to continue at 
modest rates but without significant interruptions into the nineteenth century. In Portugal, by 
contrast, incomes grew much faster in the first half of the eighteenth century, then stagnated, 
and then decline set in, and this continued into the nineteenth century. While Portugal was 
able to achieve higher income levels than Spain during most of the century, Spain achieved 
higher output per capita than Portugal around 1810, and the countries continued to diverge 
thereafter. 
4.2. International comparisons 
We now shift the discussion from index-based measures to comparison of income lev-
els.23 There are two options. The most standard is to use 1990 “international” (GK) dollars 
(Table 3). This method (“Maddison’s method”) starts with a benchmark and moves back using 
constant price per capita growth rates. The results in Table 3 are shown using the benchmark 
at which each each given volume indexes series ends. For instance, for England/Britain, the 
                                                          
22 When interpreting the results discussed in this subsection one should keep in mind that while there is consider-
able uncertainty about income levels, we can place high confidence in general trends. 
23 There is much more uncertainly about levels than trends (Jong and Palma 2018). 
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Broadberry et al (2015) series ends in 1870, so we are using the 1870 benchmark.24 Due to in-
dex number problems, this can sometimes give rather different results from what one would 
obtain by linking these “premodern” series with later series. Take Spain as an example. The 
Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013) series stop in 1850. Using the 1850 bench-
mark together with volume indexes, Spain’s income per capita level in 1500 becomes 846 “in-
ternational” dollars of 1990. This is clearly above subsistence, but relatively low by Western 
European standards. However, using an apparently similar methodology leads to a higher level, 
912 “international” GK dollars of 1990.25 As another example, consider Sweden. While in Table 
3 we give 853 GK dollars of 1990 for Sweden in 1600, an apparently similar alternative would 
lead to much lower levels, only 761“international” GK dollars of 1990 in the same year.26 
The alternative to the Maddison method is the indirect method of Prados de la Es-
cosura’s (2000), which we call the Prados method. This is show in Table 4.27 Using the 1850 
relative levels from Prados de la Escosura’s (2000) as the baseline implies that during the six-
teenth century Spain and Portugal were among the richest economies of Western Europe, sec-
ond only to the small republics of northern and central Italy. As previously explained, by 1600 
Portugal had lost ground but Spain was still able to retain a considerable income per head, 
higher than the levels observed in France or England. The seventeenth century saw the origin 
of the small divergence between the Iberian economies and those in the ‘core’ of Europe, as 
output per capita fell considerably in the case of Spain and stagnated in Portugal, while it in-
creased in all the major economies of the continent except the Netherlands. The latter was 
nonetheless able to maintain its considerable advantage over the southern economies. Finally 
(and despite Portugal’s temporary boom during the period 1700-1755), overall the Iberian re-
covery of the eighteenth century was too short lived and not strong enough to close the gap 
with the richest countries in Europe by 1800. 
                                                          
24 We use the benchmark which Broadberry et al (2015) use for Britain in 1870. This differs from Maddison’s 
(2006) lower benchmark for the United Kingdom in 1870. It makes sense to exclude Ireland since the volume in-
dexes do not include it, and it was it was much poorer than the rest of the United Kingdom (Britain). 
25 This alternative consists of taking per capita GDP at current Euro in 1990, converted to 1990 Geary-Khamis 
dollars with the Purchasing Power Parties of the International Comparison Program, projected back using Prados 
de la Escosura’s (2017) indexes for 1850-1990, and linking them in 1850 to those of Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de 
la Escosura (2013). See also Prados de la Escosura (2016). 
26 This alternative consists of going back from Sweden’s 1990 benchmark using data from The Conference Board, 
Total Economy Database for 1950-1990, linked with the Schön and Krantz (2012) data for 1560-1950. 
27 While more common, the GK method has a number of disadvantages (Prados de la Escosura 2000, Deaton and 
Heston 2010, Allen 2013). For example, Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013, p. 36) show that using 
the GK method, in 1850 the price level for Spain would have been 109 (relative to UK =100), which suggests that 
Spanish real GDP per capita is probably under-estimated for that benchmark. 
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Table 3. Output per capita in Western Europe (1990 Geary-Khamis “international” dollars), using the 
Maddison method. Sources: Annual growth rates from the following sources. For England, Broadberry 
et al (2015); for Holland, van Zanden and van Leuween (2012); for Germany, Pfister (2011); for France 
until 1789, Ridolfi (2016); for Italy, Malanima (2011); for Spain, Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Es-
cosura (2013); for Sweden, Schön and Krantz (2012) and Krantz for 1500-1560. For Portugal, Henriques 
et al (2019) for 1500-1527, and Palma and Reis (2019) for 1527-1850. The levels in this table are calcu-
lated by applying these volume indexes to benchmarks corresponding to the endpoint year of each in-
dex. In the case of England, figures correspond to the volume indexes of England before 1700 and Great 
Britain afterwards applied to the 1870 level of Great Britain (Broadberry et al 2015, pp. 375-376). In the 
case of Holland, borders correspond to Holland until 1800 and the Netherlands for 1850; a benchmark 
for 1807 was used for the data prior to 1800 (van Zanden and van Leuween 2012, p. 121), and the 1850 
level is from Smits et al (2000). The other benchmarks are from Maddison (2006) and correspond to 
1820 for France (with additional assumptions; see Ridolfi 2016, p. 196), 1850 for Germany, Spain, and 
Portugal, and 1913 for Italy and Sweden. The 1800 level shown for France in the table is Ridolfi’s 1789 
level. For France in 1850, the level is that given in Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013, p. 
23). Italy corresponds to north and central Italy only; Germany corresponds to the present-day borders 
of Germany. 
 
England Holland Germany France Italy Spain Sweden 
 
Portugal 
1500 1,041 1,454 1,146 935 1,367 846 1,195 1,125 
1550 1,014 1,798 — 809 1,278 891 1,125 836 
1600 1,037 2,662 806 901 1,216 893 853 790 
1650 887 2,691 948 965 1,247 668 941 830 
1700 1,513 2,105 939 992 1,317 814 1,357 987 
1750 1,753 2,355 1,050 1,010 1,367 783 1,061 1372 
1800 2,097 2,609 986 1,045 1,216 916 930 916 
1850 2,718 2,355 1,428 1,597 1,321 1,079 1,171 923 
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While during the first half of the nineteenth century all the main economies of Western 
Europe increased their output per head, the decrease experienced by Portugal meant that the 
country fell considerably behind. The case of Spain was different in absolute but not in relative 
terms. Although GDP per capita levels increased in Spain, the growth was much slower than 
that achieved by the main European economies. Therefore, the Iberian economies were not able 
to take advantage of the first industrial revolution in the way that most of north-western Eu-
rope did, increasing the gap and therefore the divergence between the south and the north that 
had already started in the seventeenth century.  
 England Holland Germany France Italy Sweden Spain Portugal 
1500 1,060 858 1,137 1,160 1,578 835 1,160 1,415 
1550 1,060 858 - - 1,485 812 1,253 951 
1600 1,006 1,578 789 1,160 1,392 835 1,230 905 
1650 924 1,601 - - 1,438 - 951 951 
1700 1,495 1,253 928 1,253 1,508 1,230 1,114 1,137 
1750 1,658 1,392 1,044 1,276 1,578 951 1,067 1,578 
1800 2,039 1,554 974 1,299 1,392 928 1,253 1,044 
1850 2,718 1,833 1,415 1,810 1,531 1,206 1,485 1,067 
 
Table 4. Output per capita in Europe (1990 Geary-Khamis “international” dollars), using the 
Prados method. Purchasing power parities are from Prados de la Escosura (2000, p. 24) and the 
1850 benchmark in 1990$ for England is that of Great Britain (GB); borders are treated as in 
Table 3. Sources: Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013), except Sweden in 1500, 
which we obtain through a similar method, and Portugal, which we obtain by applying the 
1850 benchmark of Prados de la Escosura (2000) to the data from Palma and Reis (2019) until 
1527 and Henriques et al (2019) for 1500-1527. Italy’s 1860 level assumed to be that of 1850. 
We transformed the relative levels by using the UK to GB ratio of 0.85 (where the UK level for 
1850 is from Maddison 2006, p. 437). 
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5. Conclusion 
Recent research in the long term evolution of income per capita in Iberia has challenged 
the traditional view of Spain and Portugal as perpetually backward and underdeveloped econ-
omies.28 The use of new archival material such as wages, rents or tithes has shown that in fact, 
by 1500 Spain and Portugal were among the richest regions in Europe. It is also the case that – 
unlike the claim of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) – by 1500 the Iberian economies 
did not have “worse” institutions than England or the Netherlands. Henriques and Palma 
(2019) show that a political divergence is noticeable from the mid-seventeenth century, hence 
taking place before the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, which several scholars identify as the 
watershed moment which prompted the English economy forwards (e.g. North and Weingast 
1989). 
In the Spanish case, the levels reached in the sixteenth century corresponded to a recov-
ery from the long and deep crisis that followed the Black Death, an event which had severe 
consequences, destroying the foundations of a frontier economy that had already reached signif-
icant income levels by the mid-thirteenth century. However the recovery experienced reversed 
in the seventeenth century, when Spain suffered a considerable contraction of her economy. 
The recovery started in the last decades of the seventeenth century and continued during the 
following, a process that speeded up during the first decades of the nineteenth century, when 
Spain was finally able to recover the income per capita levels reached before the Black Death.  
Although Portugal started from a very similar income level, it followed a very different 
trend. During the first half of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese economy suffered an in-
tense crisis that halved income levels. The crisis was followed by a quick recovery that lasted 
until the mid-seventeenth century, when the economy entered again in a period of recession. 
The first decades of the eighteenth century were again a period of strong and sustained growth 
when Portugal was able to match and surpass the income levels reached around 1500. Howev-
er, the recovery did not last long and from the second half of the eighteenth century, the Por-
tuguese economy declined, losing most of the advances achieved during the early modern peri-
od. 
                                                          
28 A Malthusian view of permanent stagnation is also not appropriate, though it is true that by 1800 these econo-
mies were not considerably better-off than they had been 300 years earlier. 
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Therefore, we conclude that, in the long run, we cannot observe a common growth pat-
tern in the Iberian economies, in opposition to Maddison (2006, p. 249), who considered that 
the economies of Spain and Portugal were similar. The sixteenth century was a period of diver-
gence when Spain moved forward and Portugal fell behind most of the time, a situation that 
reversed during the last quarter of the century when the crisis in Spain set it and the growth in 
Portugal matched the income levels in both countries before 1640. The Portuguese economy 
experienced a stronger and more intense recovery during the first half of the eighteenth centu-
ry, being able to obtain a higher output per capita than her Spanish counterpart. However, the 
takeoff did not last for long, and between 1750 and 1850 Spain moved forward and Portugal 
lost ground. In the case of Portugal, the twists and turns of history have been truly remarkable. 
Preliminary estimates by Henriques et al (2019) suggest that it took until the middle of the 
eighteenth century for Portugal to recover the income per capita levels of the mid-fourteenth 
century. Perhaps even more remarkably, it was not until the 1920s that the country would be 
able to enjoy the income per head levels of the mid-eighteenth century. 
The comparison with the main economies of north-western Europe shows that, as ex-
plained before, Spain and Portugal were among the most affluent nations. Their relative posi-
tion, especially with the largest economies, did not change much during the sixteenth century. 
The small divergence between Iberia and the main economies of Europe only finally started in 
the seventeenth century for Spain, and only as late as the mid-eighteenth century for Portugal. 
It speeded up during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the effects of the first 
industrial revolution were already clear in the ‘core’ of the European economy, but were weakly 
felt in Spain and Portugal. By 1850, the relative position of Iberia in Europe had changed radi-
cally compared to the situation in 1500, and both Spain and Portugal had fallen from the top to 
the bottom of the income distribution.  
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